Two Million Fake Keys in AI Prompts: Dragos's Canary Experiment Shows the AI Supply Chain Leaks Like a Sieve
On 19 November 2026, Dragos published its canary experiment: over five months it sent nearly two million prompts carrying unique secrets to AI services, and found at least three hosting providers already breached, marketplace sellers reading prompts through plain request logging, and zero-data-retention flags that bind only the first hop.

In short: after planting nearly two million fake secrets in AI prompts, Dragos found the AI inference supply chain leaks like a sieve
On 19 November 2026, HD Moore, chief research officer at industrial security firm Dragos, published the results of a five-month experiment. From July to November, his team sent nearly two million prompts to widely used AI services, each one hiding a unique secret that had never existed anywhere else — a working AWS key, an SSH password, a one-off URL, or a reference to a private code repository. Then they waited on the other end to see where those secrets would turn up. The results were worse than the pessimistic forecast: at least three AI hosting providers had already been breached, with attackers quietly stealing customer prompts; sellers on inference marketplaces could read your prompts with no hacking at all, just by switching on request logging; and even the strictest privacy setting, "zero data retention", often turned out to be an empty promise. This is not a scandal about one provider. It is a systemic failure of an entire chain — and before your prompt ever reaches a model, it passes through far more hands than you know.
This deserves a piece of its own, not only because the numbers are alarming, but because it punctures a premise the whole industry takes for granted. When people talk about AI safety, they stare at the model itself — will it say the wrong thing, can it be jailbroken — and rarely ask a simpler question: whose hands does your prompt pass through on the way there? Moore's experiment turned that question into something measurable. A secret lives in exactly one place; the moment it shows up somewhere else, you know that link in the chain leaked. And the measurement says the leaks are everywhere. For developers who paste code, keys and customer data into prompts every day, this report is not distant news. It is a direct challenge to how you work.
How the experiment worked: two million needles, each stuck in exactly one place
The method matters, because almost all of this study's credibility rests on it. A canary token is an old idea: you create a secret that exists in only one place, and if anyone ever uses it, you know that place was exposed. Moore's team started in July with Thinkst's free Canarytokens service, putting a real AWS key — tied to an empty account with full logging — plus a never-before-seen domain name and URL into each prompt. The canaries started firing within days, and the ones planted in July are still firing today. The proof of concept worked so well that the team built a dedicated seeding platform: for every prompt it generates a unique seed, derives unique hostnames, URLs and credentials from it, and runs the services those credentials point to — DNS, web, git, SSH, databases, mail, and a long tail of older protocols. The key point: each secret went into exactly one prompt sent to exactly one provider, so any use of it traces back precisely to the prompt, the model, the route and the privacy setting that carried it.
But knowing that something leaked is not enough; the team also wanted to know where it leaked. So they built something like a traceroute for AI inference. First, each prompt carries an image URL pointing back to their servers, and every system that fetches it gives away an IP address, an HTTP client and a timestamp. Second, they exploit how these services are stacked: they send small, slightly broken requests, and since each router tends to wrap the error from the hop behind it in its own format, a single response can contain three or four nested "envelopes". Matching each layer against a signature database reveals the hops, the software at each one, the network they use, and often the company operating it. So far they have traced about two thousand routes. Several hundred of those include a system they could not identify, and a handful sent their image to a company that was never on the advertised path at all. One marketplace seller quietly adds about a thousand hidden tokens to every prompt it serves; another fetches images through a shared consumer subscription account. The journey a prompt takes is far more complicated than the single line on your invoice.
Finding one: three hosting providers had already been breached — and didn't know it
The most serious finding is also the most direct: attackers were actively stealing data from three different AI hosting providers. Moore's bait prompts were processed alongside real customer requests, and if the bait was copied, the real requests were almost certainly copied too. The earliest incident dates back to mid-July, and none of the three providers knew about their breach until Dragos notified them. One provider first assumed a misconfigured internal tool, then a problem with partner data processing, until the investigation uncovered evidence that the attacker had compromised their internal credentials tooling too — and that provider has still not publicly disclosed the incident, with its stolen data still producing login attempts in late October.
The largest breach happened in a few short windows in late October: a couple hundred AWS keys were stolen, and every request sent to that provider during those windows was stolen — including requests the provider had rejected before a model ever ran. That tells us the attacker was copying requests at the provider's front door, not somewhere deep in the inference stack. Once the attacker had the credentials, the playbook was predictable: first test each key to see if it was live, in some cases within a few hours; then go looking for data, listing S3 buckets and searching Secrets Manager and Parameter Store; finally try enabling hosted models in AWS Bedrock, creating Bedrock API keys, and adding their own IAM users to keep access. In total, the bait keys were used for tens of thousands of AWS API calls. One more detail worth noting: a single adversary appears to have compromised two of these providers at the same time — secrets sent to both were used together, almost immediately, from a single rented server, with tooling that changed over three weeks from a script pretending to be Chrome on Windows, to Boto3 running inside OrbStack, to the AWS CLI on Kali Linux. On 1 November the same attacker added ARTEX, an LLM-driven penetration testing framework. It did very little in this case, but its user agent strings, artex-agent and artex-judge-r121, do not appear in any public indicator list — worth adding to your detections.
Finding two: marketplace sellers need no exploit to read your prompts
The second finding required no attacker at all. In inference marketplaces, sellers offering popular models at the lowest price can simply enable request logging and read every prompt that comes through. What surprised the team was how manual it was. In one case, they sent two prompts through a single seller's offer; about a day and a half later, someone on a home broadband connection opened both secret URLs in a desktop browser and started guessing usernames at the login page by hand. In another, someone on a Mac in France typed seeded passwords into root SSH attempts — four tries in two minutes — then tested several AWS keys in a single session. Prompts for the same model routed through other sellers were never touched: the leak follows the seller, not the marketplace.
This finding also exposes a more hidden problem: some routers that advertise direct paths were quietly forwarding some of their traffic into the marketplace. Moore's team caught one doing exactly that; told about it, the router said it had stopped. But the phrase "has stopped" is itself the problem: the path a customer sees on the bill and the path a prompt actually travels can be two different things. More worrying is the pricing logic of the marketplace — sellers can offer deep discounts because they pool requests through unmetered consumer-plan subscriptions, startup credits and other low-cost paths, and in the shadier marketplaces it is common to see inference billed to stolen AWS credentials or consumer API keys. Moore puts it bluntly in the report: some of these services only accept cryptocurrency "for a reason". When your prompt is traded as a commodity in a marketplace, the person reading it does not need to break into anything. They only need to be the cheapest.
Finding three: the zero-retention checkbox only binds the first hop
The third finding used no credential at all, yet it may matter most to ordinary users: the secret URLs in prompts were scraped, repeatedly, and the git repositories they referenced were targeted for cloning — all by companies that were never supposed to see the prompt in the first place, and often in direct conflict with the privacy settings on the request. The clearest example involves a Chinese AI lab. Between July and October, its systems fetched the secret URLs from more than half of the prompts sent to its models, including roughly two-thirds of the requests explicitly marked "no data collection" or zero data retention. The scraper typically showed up two or three days after the request. More troubling, this was not limited to requests sent to the lab directly: several US hosting providers resell this lab's models, and prompts sent to those providers triggered the exact same scraper. A customer who picked a US provider specifically to keep their data in the US did not get what they paid for. Later on, a git client on a different cloud started trying to clone the private repositories referenced in the prompts — but only for prompts that used this lab's models.
The large US providers failed their own policies too. One continued to crawl a secret URL more than two months after a single inference call to its search endpoint. Another runs a scraper that comes back for the URLs days after each request, regardless of which router delivered it. The strangest incident involved a company chat: twenty-four days after a prompt was sent to one Chinese provider, the secret link from that prompt was posted into a Feishu chat channel. Within two minutes, the link was opened from three desktops and three phones in Beijing and Shanghai. Dragos' disclosure to that provider included only the first eight characters of the link, so whoever shared it was reading from a stored copy of the full prompt — a prompt that had originally gone to a US-based provider with the zero-data-retention flag. Moore's conclusion is a single sentence: zero data retention is supposed to mean something. In practice, these prompts were retained, shared with other companies, and read by people.
Why this happens: the router business is built on taking one more look at your prompt
Put the three findings together and the cause is not mysterious. The business model of AI inference guarantees that prompts pass through many hands: a router offers a single API endpoint and forwards your request to a pool of available models, sometimes at different hosting providers, with unified billing. To save money and stay flexible, a request often passes through more than one router before reaching another provider, and from there the server hosting the target model. Every hop can see the entire prompt and response. Providers commonly store prompts and responses for operational, training, safety, abuse-monitoring or business purposes, retaining that data for days, months or indefinitely. Privacy controls do exist — customers can set flags at the account level, for a specific API key, or in each request, the strictest being zero data retention, which specifies that the prompt and response are not stored, and routers should only forward such requests to providers offering the same controls. But in reality, providers often ignore these settings, intentionally or through bugs in their processing flow, and prompts not covered by zero retention are fair game for resale into a massive ecosystem of buyers and sellers.
The story is still developing. In a 21 November update, Ars Technica reported that OpenRouter has emailed customers warning that some of their prompts may have been read, saying the potential exposure involved prompts sent to MiniMax, a China-based model provider — whether sent directly or through three resellers, AtlasCloud, Novita and StreamLake. Dragos says it has now notified about a dozen providers, one of which has published a preliminary security notice, and reactions have been mixed: some have started their own investigations, while stolen keys and secret URLs continue to be accessed months after the original incidents. Moore's team is also honest about the limits of the method: a canary shows that a prompt leaked, but not necessarily where in the chain, since a router typically reports a single upstream provider, and that provider is often just another router. The three breached providers are not named, for the same reason — nobody outside Dragos and those companies can independently check the findings yet. That does not weaken the conclusion: the evidence is logs of bait keys actually being used, not a company's verbal assurance.
My judgement: the cheapest inference is always paid for by someone — and it may be you
Start with what this study does best: it turns an abstract worry into a verifiable measurement. Until now, the debate about "will my prompt be stolen" mostly ran on the text of providers' privacy policies — you believed them, or you didn't. Moore's method sidesteps trust entirely: a secret lives in exactly one place, and whoever touches it is the evidence. The method itself is worth copying. Dragos closes the report with five recommendations, in rough order of protection. Self-host if you can afford it — the only option where nobody else reads your prompts, but the hardware is not cheap: an NVIDIA DGX Spark costs $6,950, a Mac Studio with 512 GB of memory starts at $22,299, a DGX Station starts at about $105,000, and an eight-GPU B300 server lists for $570,000 or more, so for most teams this only makes sense for the most sensitive work. Failing that, go directly to a first-tier provider: one company, one contract, one privacy policy — the smallest exposure you can buy. If you use routers, pick the upstream providers yourself, verify that your privacy settings actually change where requests go, and stay away from reseller marketplaces. Then seed your own canaries: add a fake credential to the context your agents and pipelines already send, and treat any use of it as an incident — a free Canarytoken from Thinkst is enough to get started today. Finally, enable secret filtering: some providers offer settings that scrub known credential formats from prompt data. It can't hurt, but it's no panacea — there is plenty of sensitive data in prompts that isn't shaped like an API key.
Now for what this means for vibe coding developers in particular. More and more people write code with AI by pasting an entire codebase, real API keys, customer database connection strings and internal documents straight into prompts, and some let agents forward all of that to third-party models and routing services automatically. Signal's blog last week was about the operating system reading your screen; Dragos is about the supply chain reading your prompts — two stories about the same truth: once data leaves your machine, its fate is no longer yours to decide. Cheap inference most of all: when a route is priced absurdly low, ask who is paying the difference — the answer is very likely your prompt itself. The practical approach is to tier your work: keep the most sensitive jobs on a direct first-tier provider or a local model; keep keys and real credentials out of prompts, using placeholders wherever you can; and plant a canary in your agent context and check regularly whether it has ever fired. A canary will not plug the leak for you, but it will tell you where the leak is — and before November 2026, almost nobody knew there were this many.
How this relates to our earlier coverage
Last cycle we published a security story of our own: Signal blocking screenshots by default, to stop OS-level AI agents from reading the screen. That piece was about reading at the operating-system layer — an assistant's screen perception bypassing end-to-end encryption. This one is about leakage at the supply-chain layer — prompts copied, logged and stolen as they move between routers, resellers and hosting providers. The two share the big theme that your data is leaving your control, but the event, the companies, the evidence and the defences are entirely different, with no overlap. The other story from last cycle, METR's capability evaluation, is about how long models can work, and sits on a different plane again. OpenRouter, MiniMax and zero-data-retention settings have never appeared as a topic in any of our earlier articles.
One last thought for anyone who pastes things into prompts all day: Moore's team spent five months and nearly two million prompts proving something the industry should have proved itself — the prompt you send travels further than you think, and is seen by more people than you think. Cheap is never free. When inference is priced too low to make sense, the difference is very likely being paid with your data. Next time you are about to paste a key into a prompt, ask one question first: whose hands will this prompt pass through? If you cannot answer that, don't paste it yet.
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